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After 1945 the re-opened Family Courts of the German West Zones took a christian-
occidental idea of marriage as a basis, by reinterpretating the Nazi-influenced, still 
valid Marriage Act 1938. This way they contributed to re-education after 12 years of 
Nazism. Which were the ideological Fundaments of re-education? The struggle for 
an ideological realignment begun in post-war Germany immediately after the war 
and was inseparably entwined with the struggle for the sovereignty of authoritative 
definition over the terms “marriage” and “family”. Until 1945 "morality" in the 
sense the German Marriage Act simply meant “fertility”. After 1945 “morality” 
simply meant that in principle marriages were indissoluble. If a woman had married, 
she could be sure after a very short time to have acquired a right to lifelong care 
through lifelong marriage. This article shows the way from “morality” to “morality”. 
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Después de 1945, se reabrieron los tribunales de familia en las zonas de Alemania 
Occidental, basados en una idea cristiana-occidental del matrimonio, reinterpretada 
por los  nazis, siguiendo válida la ley del matrimonio de 1938. De esta manera  se 
contribuía  a la reeducación tras 12 años de nazismo. ¿Cuáles fueron los 
fundamentos ideológicos de la reeducación? El combate  por el reajuste ideológico, 
que comenzó inmediatamente después de la guerra, estuvo entrelazado a la disputa 
sobre la definición oficial de los términos "matrimonio" y "familia". Hasta 1945 la 
"moral”, en el sentido de la Ley de matrimonio alemán significaba simplemente 
"fertilidad". Después de 1945 la "moral" simplemente significa que, en principio, los 
matrimonios eran indisolubles. Si una mujer se había casado, podía estar segura que 
había adquirido un derecho a la atención de toda la vida, a través de un matrimonio 
para toda la vida. En este artículo se muestra el camino de la "moral" a la 
"moralidad" 
Palabras clave: leyes, postguerra, matrimonio cristiano, divorcio
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fter May 8, 1945 the Allied Control Council abolished numerous 
laws enacted be-tween 1933 and 1945 because of their evident 
national-socialistic content (Etzel, 1992). However, not all laws 
whose legislative reasoning draw in one way or other upon the racial 
(“völkisch”) nazi-ideology were abrogated. In fact, the vast majority of the 
laws of this time remained in effect unchanged in post-war Germany. Thus, 
when the German courts resumed work in 1945/1946, the judges had to 
face the legally as well as politically demanding task to apply paragraphs 
written between 1933 and 1945 based upon nationalistic ideology in totally 
changed political circumstances. In this they were rather on their own. Until 
1949 when the Federal Republic of Germany was founded, Germany had 
no democratically legitimated legislator who could implement and enforce 
new values or new legal parameters. Left alone with this task the judges 
only knew: “As you were!” was no option. But what should they do 
instead? How the courts handled this situation of the first years after 1945 
and how they took the chance to re-educate the parties involved in their 
cases very explicitly on the new values, is subject matter of the following 
article. As example of this fascinating reaction of the legal system on the 
change of the political regime serves the jurisdiction on the so called 
“Zerrüttungsscheidung” (divorce based upon “irretrievable breakdown”). 
 
Marriage law as instrument of population policy 
Introduction of “irretrievable breakdown” as grounds for divorce in 
Germany 
According to the German civil law code of 1900 (“Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch – BGB”) a divorce could only be filed based upon certain 
grounds, namely adultery (“Ehebruch”, § 1564 BGB 1900), “bösliche 
Verlassung” (literally translated “abandonment in bad faith” § 1567 BGB 
1900), or other “severe violations or neglect of marital duties” (§ 1568 BGB 
1900). 
With the “Marriage law” of 1938 (“Ehegesetz 1938”- EheG) the laws on 
marital status were removed from the BGB and cast into a new separate 
statute; the law also introduced some changes with regards to the content of 
A 
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marriage law: Divorce could now not only be filed based upon the above 
mentioned grounds of fault but also when,  
 
The common household of the spouses has not been shared for three 
years and a recovery of the spousal relationship in a way according to 
the nature of marriage is not to be expected due to a fundamental 
irretrievable break down of the marital relationship (§ 55 para. 1 EheG 
1938).  
 
This meant a three tiered test: (1.) a three year separation, (2.) the 
irretrievable break down, (3.) the prognosis that it is unlikely that the marital 
relationship could be re-established. 
However, the defendant could object to the divorce if the break down was 
totally or partially fault of the plaintiff (§ 55 para. 2 sen. 1 EheG 1938). The 
divorce based upon break down – today normally considered as a “no-fault 
divorce” - had still an aspect of fault divorce, the still prevalent divorce 
principle of those times.  This objection was denied, “If in the light of a true 
appreciation of the nature of marriage and the entirety of the conduct of both 
spouses the perpetuation of the marriage was not morally justified” (§ 55 
para. 2 sen. 2 EheG 1938). The requirements to deny the objection against 
the divorce were thus – excect for the factual conduct of the spouses – 
mainly a moral evaluation according to superior points of view as the 
obviously normatively enriched terms “true appreciation of the nature of 
marriage” and “morally justified” demonstrate. 
 
Morality means fertility: The “Reichsgericht” on § 55 EheG 1938  
 
Fundament of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the German Reich, 
the “Reichsgericht”, pertaining to § 55 EheG (1938), was the national-
socialistic understanding of marriage. The individual contractual 
commitment of both spouses took a back seat as well as religious aspects. 
With its jurisdiction, which basically always denied objections to the divorce 
according to § 55 para. 2 EheG (1938), the “Reichsgericht” pursued actively 
a population policy of its own (Niksch, 1990). In this regard it is not really 
important whether the court was more or less willing to grant a divorce than 
courts today, for § 55 EheG (1938) established stricter requirements for 
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divorce than §§ 1565 ff. BGB (1900) do today. Equally unimportant is the 
fact that the no-fault divorce based upon irretrievable break down was 
actually no mind child of the national-socialistic legislation (Selbert, 1930) 
as government drafts from the Weimar Republic show. The real question is 
with which reasoning the “Reichsgericht” justified its decisions against or 
for granting a divorce. The decisions demonstrate clearly that the court 
oriented itself strictly towards ideological, national-socialistic principles 
(Niksch, 1990, p. 107). Ex officio it collected evidence as to all 
circumstances which could be used to facilitate an evaluation of the marriage 
as “valuable” or “worthless” according to the objectives of the national 
socialistic population policy. The question whether the spouses had actually 
drifted apart irreversibly, however, did not matter. 
On its own accord the “Reichsgericht” went beyond the compromise found 
by the National Socialist lawmakers themselves with the “irretrievable break 
down” as a regulation between fault and no-fault-marriage principle and 
basically ignored the three tiered structure of “rule, exception and counter-
exception” by holding the second tier, the objection to the marriage under § 
55 paragraph 2 EheG (1938) basically as irrelevant. The court also 
succeeded in enforcing this line consistently against the lower courts. The 
legislature itself had wavered whether the principle of “irretrievable break 
down” should be introduced and to what extent population policy could be 
pursued without devaluating the principle of marriage totally (Niksch, 1990, 
255). The Supreme Court did not share these scruples and turned § 55 para. 
2 EheG (1938) into an instrument of population policy. Sole criterion for a 
“true appreciation of the nature of marriage” was generating genetically 
healthy offspring for the national community as a function of marriage. 
Could a marriage not or no longer fulfil this function, it had to be dissolved, 
even more so, if the spouses or one of them could fulfil this function in 
another, may already existing new relationship or already had it fulfilled in a 
former one. 
Thus, "morality" in the sense § 55 paragraph 2 EheG (1938) simply 
meant “fertility”. Thinking along these lines the irrelevance of the objection 
was almost self-evident: If one spouse filed for divorce, the chance of 
offspring out of this marriage was slim, hence any objection against the 
divorce was immaterial. The court sustained an objection to the divorce only 
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in exceptional cases, when the husband, who mostly filed for di-vorce, was 
so advanced in years that he could not enter into any relationship desira-ble 
from a point of view of population policy or the marriage had so far fulfilled 
its desired function by producing a great number of children and the wife 
had sacrificed her best years in “service to husband and children." Since the 
divorce left women usually worse off financially, the wives being defendant 
often objected to the divorce. 
 
The situation after 1945 
 
In 1946 the Allied Control Council adopted a marriage law for all four 
occupation zones, which resembled the Marriage Law of 1938 in many 
parts. § 55 EheG (1938) became § 48 EheG (1946), the text remained 
unchanged and only a § 48 para 3 EheG 1946 was supplemented, adding that 
special consideration should be paid to the needs of common, minor 
children. 
The judges who had to apply the "new" marriage law were aware that 
national-socialistic standards could no longer apply and that the application 
of legal terms requiring a moral judgement needed now a different approach 
than before the "col-lapse." But the courts did not have any clue on the 
values which were now applica-ble. Dölle (1946, p. 18) for example stresses 
that the concept of a divorce due to irretrievable break down introduced in 
1938 actually conveyed a far older intent of reform of mar-riage law which 
was now discredited by the courts jurisdiction during the Third Reich, since 
the Supreme Court had applied § 55 EheG (1938) in a manner that the wife 
was mostly left defenceless against the demand of the husband for a divorce 
who had grown wary of the marriage. The task at hand was to apprehend the 
“true” nature of marriage. But what was "true"? Surprisingly the judges 
reached a consensus on that question rather quickly. The jurisdiction of the 
regional court Nuremberg (“Landgericht (LG)” Nuremberg) is an example of 
that consensus. Though Nuremberg, an industrial metropolis in the north-
eastern part of Bavaria, was a heavily damaged by the war, about 2800 
almost all complete records of the LG Nuremberg on court proceedings in 
marriage matters of the year 1946 can be found in the public record office of 
Nuremberg. Almost 3% of the files are divorces according to § 48 EheG. 




Opposition to the disruption divorce in the marriage records of the LG 
Nuremberg from 1946 
 
In many cases the LG Nuremberg sustained the objection to divorce, though 
the Su-preme Court would surely have denied it. What was the legal 
reasoning? What val-ues propagated the judges - often in a manner 
surprising to the parties involved? 
 
The leitmotifs: Provision for the wife and morally imperative 
perpetuation of the marriage 
 
Already in the first divorce proceedings after 1945 the leitmotifs of the 
future divorce practice are audible. In case file no. 3 R 4/46 the couple had 
married in 1921 and separated in 1925. The marriage had produced two 
children who were already of age at the time of the proceedings. The judge, 
director of the court (“Landgerichtsdirektor”) Söllner, however, dismissed 
the case for divorce despite 20 years of separation. The plaintiff had left the 
family when his wife was pregnant with the second child, "only to be able to 
indulge in his penchant for other women”. Only under duress he had paid 
alimony and the financial situation of the divorcee would get even worse if 
the plaintiff could remarry. The main elements of the legal reasoning against 
a divorce were thus the economic situation of the wife after the divorce and 
the moral condemnation of the conduct of the plaintiff and thus completely 
different criteria than before 1945. Before 1945 especially the age of the 
parties and the number of children produced by the marriage would have 
played a role.  
The plaintiff appealed against the ruling, but the court of appeal, the 
“Oberlandesgericht” (OLG) Nuremberg, dismissed the appeal (case file no. 
U 29/46) as inadmissible because no legal question of fundamental 
importance had been raised. This decision is rather surprising from the point 
of view of a historian because the change of how the district court applied § 
48 Section 2 EheG in this case might well have given ground to raise the 
question of how § 48 Section 2 EheG had to be handled now in general and 
which criteria were to be taken into account instead of the old ones. 
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Further cases focus on the question of alimony, others more on the 
indissolubility of marriage. In case no. 1 R 1030/46 considerations of 
alimony played a role. The spouses were 32 or 36 years old at the time of the 
complaint and had two children. The husband already lived with his new 
girlfriend, with whom he had a child together. The wife objected to the 
divorce because of her claim to financial maintenance. On December 17, 
1946 the court dismissed the action. The court reasoned as follows: In favour 
of granting the divorce the possibility of legitimacy for the third child of the 
husband, so far born out of wedlock, had to be taken into account, political 
considerations like population policy objectives, however, had now to be 
disregarded. In favour of the perpetuation of the marriage the court 
considered that the wife had fallen ill and was therefore no longer able to 
provide for herself and the two common children. What is interesting about 
this reasoning is that the possibility to legitimize the illegitimate child of the 
husband by means of a then possible later marriage of its natural parents was 
not held in favour of the child but was condemned to be discrimination by 
society. Due to the young age of the parties it is also astonishing that the 
court sustained the objection. Apparently the husband was now held liable 
for the illness of the wife which was neither child- nor marriage-related. 
In case file no. 2, R 1242/46, the parties had married in 1941 and had 
already separated in 1943, a classic “war marriage” probably, in which the 
parties are likely to have spent little time together. The plaintiff had begun a 
relationship with another woman, the defendant objected to the divorce. In 
its ruling of April 29
th
, 1948 the court sustained this objection, not only 
because a new marriage had to be prevented, but also because the 
defendant’s maintenance was endangered. It was not acceptable that the 
plaintiff could throw his previous wife out on the street just because he liked 
another, younger woman better. Maintaining this marriage was morally 
justified and imperative. The reasoning of the court surprises because for 
many reasons the objection could have been dismissed as unsubstantial: the 
short period of time of the marriage under conditions of war, no children, 
and the young age of both parties – by the way, the girlfriend was not that 
much younger than the wife. The defendant was not ill nor in need of 
assistance for other reasons, but could provide for herself. Sustaining the 
objection to the divorce under these circumstances actually boils down to an 
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abolition of the no-fault-model of a divorce due to irretrievable break down 
and turned a very brief marriage of two young, healthy and childless partners 
into an “Versorgungsanstalt“ (institution serving the sole purpose of 
maintenance) for the wife. The plaintiff appealed, but the Higher Regional 
Court of Nuremberg (“Oberlandesgericht” OLG) rejected the appeal under 
case no. U 103/48. The objection could only be overruled if special reasons 
had been brought forward - which was not the case. 
Among those files are other cases, in which the maintenance of the wife 
is cited as a key argument in addition to supporting arguments such as age of 
the spouse or children. The focal point of the arguments thus shifts towards 
an argument, which is hard to push aside. It seems to serve the purpose to 
hide ideological positions which would not allow for a no-fault-divorce. 
Interestingly, in a comparative perspective, the aspect of maintenance of the 
wife was the centre of the reorientation of the case law in the soviet 
occupation zone/GDR as well as in the American zone/FDR, albeit with 
totally opposite outcomes: Whereas the idea of marriage as 
“Versorgungsanstalt” was heartily rejected in the GDR and the divorced 
wife was forced to live the equality of the sexes, the courts in the American 
zone equally heartily embraced that idea and perpetuated the classical role 
models for some time.  In the American zone a wife acquired a lifelong right 
to supply out of her marriage, regardless of whether the married woman was 
able to cover her own expenses or not by remaining wife her whole life, 
even if both spouses had parted ways for long time. A barter arrangement 
between husband and wife to agree to alimony payment in exchange for a 
withdrawal of the objection to the divorce was apparently not considered. 
The following case highlights how Christian values now replaced the 
National-socialistic ones: In case file no. 1 R 1069/46, the parties were 
married since 1928, separated in 1944 and had three children. The defendant 
stated that she wanted to remain in this marriage for personal as well as 
religious reasons and objected to the divorce. The court dismissed the case 
for divorce on July 21
st
, 1949. In this case only special circumstances could 
provide the moral justification to end the marriage in question. The woman 
had suffered severe health damages during the birth of a child, and thus had 
sacrificed her health to an extent that exceeded the normal level of sacrifice 
inherent in any marriage. Additionally the woman was not able to provide 
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for herself and would possibly receive no longer any alimony if the plaintiff 
remarried. Invoking religious reasons was another substantial ground against 
the divorce. Interesting in this case is also that the court made the general 
statement that in principle the marriage was to perpetuate if objection was 
raised. This principle converted the divorce on grounds of irretrievable break 
down from a regular right to terminate a marriage into an extraordinary one. 
The perpetuation of the marriage is declared to be a moral imperative, from 
which only under exceptional circumstances a deviation may be justified. 
Age of the wife, disease, and three children would have been sufficient to 
dismiss the action for divorce, especially in this context. Nevertheless, the 
court declared explicitly the endorsement of the religious motives of the 
defendant, which was not necessarily to be expected in the area of civil 
marriage (and civil divorce). This shows that the moral imperative of 
maintaining an even broken marriage likely draw from a recourse to 
Christian values; marriage appears not to be a private affair of the married 
couple in the liberal sense, but as an institution, dominated by heteronomous 
criteria, always worth preserving. 
Similar arguments can be found in case file no. 1 R 98 /46. Here the 
spouses had married in 1934 and separated in 1943. Both had married 
young, when the parties filed the action the plaintiff was 35 years old, the 
defendant 33 years. The plaintiff had fathered an illegitimate child with 
another woman he wanted to marry. The court however sustained the 
objection to the divorce of the marriage, which also had produced a child 
because the husband had committed adultery. Again, the fact that the 
illegitimate child could then be legitimized by marriage was not a sufficient 
reason to hold the divorce morally justified. It was outweighed by the 
interest of the defendant not to become a divorcée and the child's interest in 
the continued existence of the marriage. 
 
The leading case of the BayObLG on the general relevance of the 
objection to the divorce  
 
Case file no. 3 R 1129/46 of LG Nuremberg (1946) is a good example to 
point out the general development of the post-war jurisprudence and expand 
the view on the whole of Bavaria. In this case the Bavarian Supreme 
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Regional Court (“Bayerisches Oberlandesgericht” – BayObLG) as the 
appellate court first stated its position on § 48 EheG (1946), a position the 
court would uphold in many cases to follow.  
The parties had married in 1922. The marriage had produced two 
children, one which was still underage at the time of the proceedings. The 
parties had lived separately since 1941. The defendant objected to the 
divorce because the breakdown of the marriage was no fault of hers. The 
motive behind the action for divorce was that the plaintiff had a girlfriend 
since 1939 that he wanted to marry and with whom he already had a child. 
After the divorce neither the supply of the defendant nor of her minor child 
was secured. During the marriage her health had suffered permanent 
damage. The LG Nuremberg held the objection to be irrelevant because an 
expert opinion ordered by the court had found that the defendant's illness did 
not have its cause in the birth of her younger son or was otherwise caused by 
the marriage. Thus, in its judgment of April 26
th
, 1948 the district court 
denied the correlation between disease and marriage and therefore held the 
objection to be irrelevant, as it would have happened before 1945. The 
plaintiff had also always fulfilled its obligations to pay maintenance and the 
court presumed he would continue to do so. Of the four pages of the whole 
judgement the court did not need even one page to justify the irrelevance of 
the objection. 
The defendant appealed on September 13
th
, 1948 to the Bayerisches 
Oberlandesgericht (Bavarian Supreme Regional Court). The appeal was 
based in part on a legal violation of § 48 of the Marriage Act. It stated that it 
was now recognized jurisdiction that the objection to the divorce was in 
general relevant and only in individual cases under exceptional 
circumstances a maintenance of the marriage would not seem to be morally 
justified. The Bayerisches Oberlandesgericht vacated the judgement of the 
district court of Nuremberg because of the oral proceedings March 23
rd
, 
1949 (filed under case file no. I 35/48) and remanded the case back to the 
trial court for reconsideration. The court used the appeal based upon an 
alleged infringement of § 48 para. 2 Marriage Act to state its interpretation 
of the regulation more axiomatically and develop its position on the 
relevance of the opposition, which the Nuremberg Higher Regional Court as 
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a court of appeal in the years of 1946 / 47 had never considered necessary 
(see above). 
The Bayerisches Oberlandesgericht (BayObLG) reasoned that the 
Reichsgericht had taken the position that a marriage, in which the spouses 
did not share a common household anymore and no development in 
correspondence with the purpose of marriage was to be expected, was to be 
divorced. Objectives of racial population policy had been the cornerstone of 
that position, not the interest of the parties involved. Key was whether the 
marriage still had meaning from a racial or demographic point of view. Such 
criteria could no longer play a role today. It was not longer a question of 
whether the applicant could enter into a new marriage blessed with children 
after divorce. It was the opinion of the BayObLG that the decision to 
maintain or end a marriage by granting the divorce had to be reached under 
appreciation of the true nature of marriage and in consideration of the overall 
behaviour of both spouses. The court admitted that it had not been proven 
that the suffering of the defendants was due to the marriage as well as the 
plaintiff had always fulfilled his maintenance obligation. However, the 
refutation of these two points was not enough to dismiss the objection. The 
findings were by no means sufficient to render the objection of the defendant 
irrelevant. In this specific case, until the divorce the marriage had lasted 21 
years. The marital relationship had only been clouded by the extramarital 
relations of the plaintiff. If the spouses had lived many happy years together, 
that was a clear argument in favour of maintaining the marriage as well as 
the attempt by the defendant to win the plaintiff back. In addition, the court 
needed to consider whether and to what extent a divorce would question the 
previous livelihood of the defendant. It was therefore necessary to consider 
to what the alimony might amount to in the future. These economic aspects 
were not solely decisive; however, their thorough discussion was deemed 
essential, especially if the marriage had lasted many years, the defendant 
was of advanced age and also sickly. 
In the new proceedings before the district court the defendant applied for 
a reassessment of evidence in consideration to the statements of the 
BayObLG (Bavarian Supreme Regional Court) and stated to the 
circumstances that the BayObLG had held to be relevant. Now, on March 
29
th
, 1951 the LG Nürnberg-Fürth dismissed the action for divorce. 
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According to the court the reasons for maintaining the marriage were the 
following: the long duration of marriage, two children, one of whom was a 
minor, and finally the uncertain alimony. It would have been incumbent 
upon the applicant to present the court with other special circumstances than 
the regular requirements of “irretrievable break down” to justify his action 
for divorce. In this he had failed. Thus the action for divorce had to be 
dismissed. The plaintiff filed an appeal with the Higher Regional Court of 
Nuremberg (OLG Nürnberg) and stated a variety of reasons why the court 
had to dismiss the objection to the divorce as irrelevant. Above all, he 
claimed the breakdown of the marriage was the fault of the defendant, a 
statement the Nuremberg Higher Regional Court did not give credence to. In 
its judgment of 9 January 1953 the court described in detail the "dirty 
laundry" from previous years of the marriage, which the plaintiff was forced 
to “wash” now. According to the court an impartial and unprejudiced 
outsider would see the following picture: The plaintiff had lived for many 
years with his wife. During this time, significant disturbances had not 
emerged; the plaintiff was content with his wife. Then in 1940 - very 
suddenly - everything changed when the plaintiff met his new girlfriend. 
This plot kind of forces the idea upon the observer that this woman was the 
reason for the growing dislike of the husband against his wife. Only now the 
plaintiff detected deficits in his wife that were previously not present or 
negligible. A change in perception that almost always happens when a man 
meets another woman that he likes better than his wife and to whom he 
wants to commit. Starting this new amorous relationship was thus the main 
reason of the marriage breakdown.  
Hence the objection was relevant because the maintenance of marriage 
was morally justified. In question of moral justification the degree of fault of 
the spouses was not the only factor. But if someone turned away from his 
marriage without reason, he could not claim it was morally justified to get a 
divorce. The marriage was the defendant´s main purpose in life, who 
seriously wanted to continue the marriage. The defendant was also not 
simply interested in her financial support. On the other hand she did not need 
to accept to be pushed aside just because the plaintiff had met a younger 
woman. The defendant was 53 years old and it is unlikely she would 
successfully pick up a new occupation. The plaintiff had no sufficient 
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income to entertain two women. It was possible that the girlfriend once 
married could decide that she did not need to work as a wife. If that 
happened the maintenance of the defendant was in jeopardy. Also the 
defendant was sickly. In addition to the breakdown of the marriage, which 
was already a prerequisite of § 48 para 1 EheG, special circumstances had to 
be presented convincingly in order to justified the moral unsustainability of 
the marriage. That was not the case. Therefore the action was dismissed and 
the case was now done for good. 
 
The judge as educator 
 
If a legislator creates a regulation which asks the judge to determine whether 
the maintenance of the marriage is "morally justified", he actually does not 
solve the problem of an objection against the divorce due to marital 
breakdown, because just about the question whether the maintenance of a 
broken marriage is morally justified or not, the views can differ widely, 
depending on the belief system of the judge. It is known that the “marital 
breakdown” - divorce as put down in § 48 EheG (1946) was used in the 
Soviet occupation zone / GDR to re-educate the GDR population. In the 
GDR, however, the courts held a quite different, much more modern view 
than those in the FDR, namely that it was a violation of human dignity of 
women to maintain marriages for the sole reason that the woman had a life-
long financial support. Shattered marriages were therefore to be divorced 
and the divorced wife had to provide for herself. The speedy divorce was 
thus an instrument to modify the social order in the GDR towards an 
economic independence and equal employment of both sexes. It helped 
constituting a new social order characterized by e.g. equal rights – as well as 
duties - to both sexes, it however, also served the end to incorporate women 
regularly into the work force in order to accomplish the economic re-
construction of the GDR. It also weakened the bonds of family in favour of a 
more community-oriented, socialistic idea of society. The pace at which this 
social remodelling had to take place, however, probably simply 
overwhelmed the population.  
In comparison it must not be overlooked that in the western occupation 
zones divorce law also began to be a vessel for ideological ends: The 
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jurisdiction had already taken the path to an indissoluble "Versorgungsehe" 
(“marriage for the sole purpose of provision”) which the wife was 
guaranteed if she kept to certain rules of good conduct. Although the courts 
actually did take into consideration all the circumstances for and against the 
maintenance of the marriage, all these aspects were seen in a light of 
religious or ideological ideas, in the western part of Germany those were 
rather of Christian origin. In principle marriages were indissoluble. If a 
woman had married, she could be sure after a very short time to have 
acquired a right to lifelong care through lifelong marriage - once “the 
doctor's wife”, always “the doctor's wife” - provided her own good conduct 
during the marriage. If the earnings of the husband were sufficient, there was 
also no reason for her to take up any occupation because she did not need to 
harbour any fear of economic decline due to a divorce. Of course, she would 
be or become economically dependent on her husband, who - unlike her – 
needed not to be faithful. The wife could focus on being a homemaker and 
raising the children. In the Western part of Germany the divorce due to break 
down or rather its abolishment by the jurisdiction became a means of social 
reconstruction, creating a social order with clearly defined roles for men and 
women. 
The reorientation of the case law on § 48 EheG (1946) was accompanied 
by a veritable flood of publications. This flood cannot - at least not in the 
case of § 48 EheG - be explained by the high practical significance of the 
norm: divorces on grounds of “irretrievable breakdown” made up 3% of all 
divorce cases at most and the question of the relevance of an objection by 
the defendant spouse turned up only in a miniscule subset of divorces. The 
struggle for an ideological realignment begun in post-war Germany 
immediately after the war and was inseparably entwined with the struggle 
for the “Deutungshoheit” (“sovereignty of authoritative definition”) over the 
terms “marriage” or “family”, who would decide what meant terms like 
“marriage” or “family” authoritatively and how the relationship of marriage 
and family to the state was defined. Also part of the struggle was to instruct 
the population as quickly as possible in the new meaning of this realignment. 
Thus § 55 EheG (1938), respectively § 48 EheG (1946) with their terms of 
"nature of marriage" and "moral justification of the maintenance of the 
marriage” posed the ideal opportunity to raise discussions on "today's" 
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understanding of marriage and family. Karl Haff (1950, p. 485) began his 
contribution to this post-war discourse with the very clairvoyant remark: "A 
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